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Psychologists are supposed to be
experts on how people think and
behave. Yet magicians have always
displayed a more wonderful ability
to direct thoughts and actions.
Thus, every now and again, for well
over a century, psychologists have
tried to understand how magicians
do it. 
So, in their magical quest to
discover the secret reality behind
the illusion, how have psychologists
done?
At the end of the 19th century,Hermann and Kellar were the twogreatest conjurors in the world,
though who was greatest depended upon
whose publicity one believed. In the
United States they competed over
audiences and advertising space, and each
considered the other his arch-rival. When
Hermann died in 1896, Kellar was free to
establish his reign and, aside from his
notable achievements in the world of
magic, he was almost certainly the
inspiration for the Wizard of Oz. But
before Kellar became the grand wizard,
and shortly before Hermann’s death, the
two great rivals agreed to compete in a
quite different environment – the
psychological laboratory.
This was not the first time
psychologists had taken an interest in
conjuring. Gustav Fechner had observed 
a spiritualist medium in 1878, and he had
concluded that, if it was not trickery, then
it was proof of a fourth dimension in
space. Wilhelm Wundt, who had observed
the same medium, had simply dismissed it
as conjuring, though he had no idea how 
it was done (Marshall & Wendt, 1980).
Meanwhile, in Britain, William Benjamin
Carpenter had been relying upon the
writings of conjurors in an attempt to
explain why tables were floating in
Victorian drawing rooms (Carpenter,
1871). Thus, psychological interest in
conjuring was provoked by the need to
distinguish between miracles and magic,
and to frame the extraordinary as nothing
more than curious. The curiosity, however,
had continued. 
In 1893 Alfred Binet had invited five of
France’s most eminent conjurors to his
laboratory in Paris. Binet had presented an
account of how magic worked, based on
the writings of conjurors, and observed
some similarities to certain contemporary
psychological theories. Following James
Sully’s distinction between active illusions
(such as hallucinations) and passive
illusions (that were universally
experienced), Binet had placed conjuring
effects into the latter category and argued
there were positive illusions (seeing what
is not there) and negative illusions (not
seeing what is there). Having observed
some conjuring tricks, and with reference
to recent experiments on letter recognition
times, he had used new
chronophotographic apparatus to allow
him to view some basic sleight of hand
tricks slowed down. In doing so, and by
removing the conjurors’ commentary, he
had found that the illusion was destroyed.
This, for Binet, had been a successful
separation of brute sensation from mental
interpretation (Binet, 1894). As it happens,
Georges Melies, one of the conjurors
present, would make practical use of this
distinction shortly afterwards when he
invented the first special effects in early
cinema. Binet, of course, moved on to
other topics.
The man who brought Hermann 
and Kellar together, however, was Joseph
Jastrow, who had recently established a
psychology department at the University 
of Wisconsin. He was interested in a wide
range of psychological topics, including
perception, and was the first psychologist
to use the duck–rabbit illusion in a
psychology article. Now he sought to make
a similarly difficult distinction between
two quite different beasts. His reason for
conducting these curious experiments was,
he claimed, that ‘the influence of special
kinds of occupation and training upon the
delicacy, range and quickness of sensory,
motor and mental powers is an important
and interesting problem’. For this reason,
‘psychological tests made upon virtuosi are
desirable, even if in individual cases they
suggest no very decided conclusions’. He
therefore employed a range of
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psychophysical tests that he thought ‘to be
related to the processes upon which their
dexterity depends’ and which he felt ‘most
likely to yield definite results’ (Jastrow,
1896, p.685). As it turned out, he was
wrong on both counts.
Jastrow compared the two wizards in
terms of tactile sensibility, such as point
discrimination (both were below average),
weight discrimination (both were below
average), and length discrimination by
touch (Kellar was below average, and
Hermann average). In tests of visual
perception, they were unable to divide
lines equally or judge lengths any
better than others, and in a test using
the ‘form alphabet’ (in which the
subject had 90 seconds to identify as
many instances of a chosen symbol in
a long string of symbols), Kellar was
average and Hermann ‘did not fully
comprehend what was wanted’. Both
did manage to excel in rapidity of
movement of finger and forearm, and
in reaction time to visual and tactile
stimuli. However, when the response
involved some kind of discrimination,
they were again below average.
Jastrow conceded that the positive
results were ‘small’, that ‘any
suggestions which the data seem to
warrant must be put forward with
great caution’, and that the methods
were better adapted to statistical
groups than individuals. So it was that
he pioneered a trail for psychologists
to study the topic and reach, to use his
phrase, ‘no very decided conclusions’
(pp.686–689).
Just a few years later, Norman
Triplett wrote a thesis, suggested by 
G. Stanley Hall, and published it in 
the American Journal of Psychology in
1900. This substantial article discusses
the origins of deception in mimicry, and
links various themes in conjuring to
contemporary associationist psychology.
Like Jastrow and Binet, Triplett (1900)
relied upon the writings of conjurors in
order to understand how conjuring
worked, though he did conduct an
experiment using a vanishing tennis ball. 
It seems to have been prompted by an
experiment on suggestibility, carried out 
by Binet. In that experiment, subjects had
repeatedly walked towards a ball hanging
in front of a black background, reported
when they could see it, and their distance
from the ball had been noted. They were
then asked to walk forward again but this
time the ball was not visible; nevertheless,
when they got to the same point, subjects
reported seeing the ball. This, of course,
had been part of Binet’s work on hypnosis.
Triplett’s experiment, however, was
based on an illusion sometimes used by
conjurors. A demonstrator, who was sitting
behind a desk in a schoolroom, threw a
tennis ball (though he found it worked
equally well with an apple or a silver
dollar) about three feet in the air and
caught it. He threw it a second time,
slightly higher, and caught it again. He
then secretly dropped the ball on his lap
and mimed throwing it a third time. When
asked what happened, nearly half the
pupils (40 per cent of the boys and 60 per
cent of the girls) said they saw the ball go
up and disappear. On the gender
difference, Triplett observed that
‘[according to Havelock Ellis] ecstacy,
trance, seeing of visions, illusions of fancy
and tendency to hallucinations, are more
frequent in females. Pliny tells us that
women are the best subjects for magical
experiments, and Bodin estimated the
proportion of witches to wizards at not less
than fifty to one’. On the efficacy of the
illusion, however, Triplett concluded that
‘these cases of suggestions of repetition
cited, both from the laboratory and the
stage, show plainly that the conjurer’s
maxim “to first really do what you would
have the audience believe you do” rests
upon a physiological basis’ (pp.491–494).
Triplett’s conclusion might
suggest the possibility of a
scientific theory of magic, but the
‘maxim’ he cites, like all so-called
‘rules’ in magic, is little more than
a common theme. There are no
universal rules in magic; conjurors
regularly ‘tell the audience what
they are going to do’ and
frequently ‘repeat a trick’. One of
the reasons there has never been 
a scientific theory of magic is the
problem of identifying general
rules in a form of interaction that
is specifically designed to
circumvent what rules are thought
to apply in a given situation. For
every example in which a conjuror
‘really does’ what will then be
simulated, there are countless
examples of a conjuror simply
doing something devious once 
and it being regarded as innocent.
Such actions are regarded as
innocent because they are deemed
natural (i.e. not suspicious) in that
time and place, and so are not
noticed (or are noticed but then
promptly forgotten). Whether it 
is necessary to ‘condition’ one’s
audience to an action depends
entirely upon whether that particular
audience at that time might regard that
particular action as suspicious. The
highly contingent nature of deceptive
entertainment is one reason why, despite
superficial appearances, there has never
been a ‘psychology of magic’ in any
meaningful sense (Lamont et al., 2010).
The fact that Jastrow, Binet and Triplett
were writing on the topic around the same
time might suggest that this was a
subdiscipline of psychology (e.g Coon,
1992), but this was an illusion. These 
were ad hoc publications, in a variety of
academic and non-academic journals, and
the lack of coherence was such that
Triplett was not even aware that Jastrow
had recently written on the topic. Indeed,
Triplett’s ball experiment was not
replicated until more than a century later,
when Kuhn and Land (2006) employed
modern eye-tracking equipment to provide
a rare example of psychology providing
some insight into why a particular magic
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Kellar, levitating
trick works. But the attempt to identify
general rules in magic that might form 
the basis for a scientific theory has been 
in vain. When Max Dessoir, the German
philosopher and psychologist, claimed that
uneducated people were harder to fool
(Dessoir, 1893), Triplett claimed the
opposite. Neither carried out any
experiments on this, but there would have
been little point. Magicians can make a
living from fooling children or adults
(including not only academics but also
fellow magicians) by employing similar
methods or misdirection techniques in
slightly different ways.
Thus, for over a century, psychologists
have periodically wondered why magic has
been neglected, and offered various
theoretical frameworks, none of which is
self-evidently better than the last (e.g.
Bernhard, 1936; Kelley, 1977; Nardi, 1984;
Lamont & Wiseman, 1999). The most
recent calls for a scientific theory are
simply the latest in a long line of attempts
to cut the conjuring cake; the slices are
fresher, but they are no more
representative. This is not to say that
magic cannot provide insight into
psychological processes, but to do so
requires (and has always required) focused
application of specific conjuring
knowledge, and a bit of historical
knowledge might not go amiss either.
Indeed, some awareness of history might
have curbed the enthusiasm of those who
have called for a scientific theory of magic,
or have proclaimed (on the basis of no
experimental work whatsoever) that
‘future studies of magic should be
grounded in neuroscience’ (Macknick &
Matrinez-Conde, 2009).
More generally, the history of
psychological interest in magic, though 
it has not been significant in terms of
findings, nevertheless does tell us
something about the how and why of
psychological knowledge. For one thing,
we can see why some people choose to
take an interest in particular topics. After
all, most psychologists who have written
on the topic have had a personal
background in magic, and many have 
been in the business of debunking psychic
phenomena. Just as Carpenter often cited
the writings of conjurors in his anti-
spiritualist articles, Jastrow’s attempt to
understand conjuring was directly linked
to his desire to debunk mediums, and
several similarly sceptical psychologists
have written on the topic since, a 
reminder that the production of
psychological knowledge is invariably
shaped by wider concerns.
What history also shows is that
experimental methods do not compensate
for a superficial understanding of an
enormous range of situational practices,
and that even the most up-to-date
technology does not necessarily provide
better knowledge in matters of complex
human interaction. After all, so far as
psychology is about understanding and
predicting human behaviour, the
experienced magician can demonstrate 
his or her ability to do so regularly (with 
a replication rate most psychologists would
envy), and to do so in the real world.
Magicians have been able to do this for
centuries, but how they have done this has
changed according to the way in which
people think and behave at different times
and in different places. Psychologists can
indeed learn from magic, but it is
magicians who understand the real secrets.
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